Η χώρα μας δεν έχει συμμορφωθεί με την συνθήκη που έχει υπογράψει.
Η επιτροπή εμπειρογνωμόνων του ΟΗΕ απεφάνθη: "Κύριοι, μας κοροϊδεύετε! Τα στοιχεία που μας δίνετε για τις εκπομπές ρύπων στην Ελλάδα δεν μας πείθουν. Η χώρα σας - μέχρι νεωτέρας - θα μείνει εκτός του Πρωτοκόλλου του Κιότο".
Η αρμόδια επιτροπή των Ηνωμένων Εθνών δεν χρησιμοποίησε, βέβαια, τη γλώσσα αυτή. Η ουσία όμως, της απόφασης που εξέδωσε (με 8 ψήφους υπέρ και 1 κατά) για τη συμμόρφωση της Ελλάδας προς τις υποχρεώσεις της απέναντι στο Πρωτόκολλο του Κιότο παραμένει η ίδια. Η χώρα μας δεν έχει συμμορφωθεί με τους κανόνες που επιβάλλει η διεθνής συνθήκη και κινδυνεύει πλέον με πρόστιμα και διεθνή διασυρμό, καθώς το σύστημα με το οποίο καταγράφει τις εκπομπές αερίων του θερμοκηπίου χαρακτηρίζεται "ανεπαρκές".
Συγκεκριμένα οι 172 χώρες που έχουν επικυρώσει το Πρωτόκολλο του Κιότο έχουν αναλάβει τη δέσμευση να συντάσσουν και να υποβάλλουν κάθε χρόνο την Εθνική Απογραφή των Εκπομπών των Αερίων του Θερμοκηπίου στην αρμόδια επιτροπή των Ηνωμένων Εθνών. Στις Αρχές Μαρτίου η Ελλάδα παραπέμφθηκε στην επιτροπή εξαιτίας της απουσίας αποτελεσματικού συστήματος καταγραφής και παρακολούθησης των ρύπων.
Στις 8 Απριλίου η ελληνική κυβέρνηση απέστειλε νέα στοιχεία, για τα οποία η επιτροπή απεφάνθη, πλέον, οριστικά κρίνοντας ανεπαρκές το ελληνικό σύστημα καταγραφής των εκπομπών αερίων του θερμοκηπίου και επιβάλλοντας ποινή αποκλεισμού της χώρας μας από τους ευέλικτους μηχανισμούς του πρωτοκόλλου (σύστημα εμπορίας δικαιωμάτων εκπομπών, επενδύσεις εξοικονόμησης ενέργειας σε αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες).
Αυτή η πρωτοφανής - για τα δεδομένα του ΟΗΕ - απόφαση πρακτικά σημαίνει ότι οι ελληνικές βιομηχανίες δεν θα μπορούν να κάνουν χρήση των δικαιωμάτων εκπομπών ρύπων.
Με άλλα λόγια, οι 152 ελληνικές επιχειρήσεις που εντάσσονται στο σχετικό εθνικό σχέδιο δεν θα μπορούν να αγοράζουν ή να πωλούν δικαιώματα εκπομπής ρύπων (κυρίως διοξειδίου του άνθρακα).
Έτσι έως το 2012 η Ελλάδα και η βιομηχανία της θα πληρώνουν πρόστιμο 100 ευρώ για κάθε τόνο ρύπων που θα θέτει τη χώρα μας εκτός του στόχου (μέση αύξηση εκπομπών όχι μεγαλύτερη του 25%).
Το έξτρα αυτό κόστος θα μεταφερθεί βέβαια και στον καταναλωτή μέσα από αυξήσεις σε πρώτες ύλες και τιμολόγια.
Χαρακτηριστικές είναι οι δηλώσεις εκπροσώπων περιβαλλοντικών οργανώσεων στον ΕΤ: ο διευθυντής της Greenpeace κ.Νίκος Χαραλαμπίδης επισημαίνει ότι "εάν δεν πάψουμε να κυνηγάμε φαντάσματα και δεν σηκώσουμε τα μανίκια για να φτιάξουμε ένα σύστημα καταγραφής που δεν "μπάζει νερά" τότε η χώρα μας θα εκτίθεται διεθνώς". Από την πλευρά του ο υπεύθυνος εκστρατειών της WWF Ελλάς κ.Αχιλλέας Πληθαράς τονίζει: "Τίθεται ζήτημα διεθνούς κατακραυγής της χώρας μας. Τώρα καλούμαστε να διορθώσουμε μια εξαιρετικά δύσκολη κατάσταση".
Οι επισημάνσεις της αρμόδιας επιτροπής του ΟΗΕ είναι ελάχιστα τιμητικές για τη χώρα μας, αποκαλύπτουν δε το μέγεθος της προχειρότητας με την οποία αντιμετωπίζονται τα περιβαλλοντικά ζητήματα. Ιδού πώς ακριβώς αξιολογεί η Επιτροπή το Εθνικό Σύστημα Απογραφής Εκπομπών:
- Έλλειψη σαφήνειας για τη φύση των θεσμικών μηχανισμών και της διαδικασίας που διασφαλίζει τη συνέχεια των μεθόδων καταγραφής.
- Έλλειψη πληροφόρησης για το κατά πόσον ο εποπτευόμενος οργανισμός που είχε αναλάβει αρχικά την προπαρασκευαστική απογραφή μετέφερε όλες τις απαιτούμενες πληροφορίες στη νέα ομάδα.
- Αδυναμία της ομάδας των ειδικών μελετητών να συναντηθεί με το προσωπικο και τους υπεύθυνους που έχουν αναλάβει την τεχνική επεξεργασία της προπαρασκευαστικής απογραφής ώστε να αποτιμήσει την τεχνολογική επάρκεια των μεθόδων που θα ακολουθήσει ο νέος φορέας. Κοντολογίς η Επιτροπή του ΟΗΕ μας λέει: Ούτε ποιος μετράει τους ρύπους σε αυτή τη χώρα ξέρουμε, ούτε αν συννεννοείστε μεταξύ σας έχουμε καταλάβει, αλλά ούτε και αν σας βρούμε μπορούμε προκειμένου να δούμε αν οι μέθοδοί σας είναι ορθές!
Τρίτη 29 Απριλίου 2008
Energy on Russian agenda
PM’s Moscow trip to focus on South Stream project as countries boost ties
Growing energy ties binding Greece and Russia are expected to top the agenda of talks between Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and Russian President Vladimir Putin next week when the Greek leader visits Moscow.
Tuesday’s visit will also be among Putin’s last meetings as president as he prepares to hand over his position to Dmitry Medvedev on May 7.
“The two countries support with their policies peace and stability in the Balkans and in the broader Southeast European area,” Karamanlis said in an interview with Russian news agency Itar-Tass yesterday. “We have mutual interests in the area of growth and prosperity and similar views on many international issues,” added Karamanlis, who also described Putin as being a friend of Greece and a great European leader.
Ties between Greece and Russia have become stronger recently as the two nations share political views on a number of issues, such as Kosovo.
Joint steps in Europe’s energy map, involving natural gas and petrol projects, have also resulted in frequent visits being made by Karamanlis and Putin to each other’s country. The latest venture is the South Stream pipeline, which will take 30 billion cubic meters of Russian gas a year to Southern Europe, with Greece becoming a transit state on the southern arm of the pipeline.
Development Ministry officials have been busy working on the final details of the South Stream agreement with their Russian peers so that the two leaders can sign the deal on Tuesday.
The project is seen as a competitor to the EU, US-backed Nabucco pipeline.
According to sources, Russia businesses are also eyeing stakes in Greek energy companies. A 950-million-euro Russian-Bulgarian-Greek oil pipeline, agreed upon last year after 14 years of negotiations, is also moving ahead and expected to enter its construction phase soon.
Karamanlis is also scheduled to meet with Medvedev during his one-day visit.
Hμερομηνία : 25/4/08
Copyright: http://www.ekathimerini.com
Posted by D.Shistohilis
Growing energy ties binding Greece and Russia are expected to top the agenda of talks between Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and Russian President Vladimir Putin next week when the Greek leader visits Moscow.
Tuesday’s visit will also be among Putin’s last meetings as president as he prepares to hand over his position to Dmitry Medvedev on May 7.
“The two countries support with their policies peace and stability in the Balkans and in the broader Southeast European area,” Karamanlis said in an interview with Russian news agency Itar-Tass yesterday. “We have mutual interests in the area of growth and prosperity and similar views on many international issues,” added Karamanlis, who also described Putin as being a friend of Greece and a great European leader.
Ties between Greece and Russia have become stronger recently as the two nations share political views on a number of issues, such as Kosovo.
Joint steps in Europe’s energy map, involving natural gas and petrol projects, have also resulted in frequent visits being made by Karamanlis and Putin to each other’s country. The latest venture is the South Stream pipeline, which will take 30 billion cubic meters of Russian gas a year to Southern Europe, with Greece becoming a transit state on the southern arm of the pipeline.
Development Ministry officials have been busy working on the final details of the South Stream agreement with their Russian peers so that the two leaders can sign the deal on Tuesday.
The project is seen as a competitor to the EU, US-backed Nabucco pipeline.
According to sources, Russia businesses are also eyeing stakes in Greek energy companies. A 950-million-euro Russian-Bulgarian-Greek oil pipeline, agreed upon last year after 14 years of negotiations, is also moving ahead and expected to enter its construction phase soon.
Karamanlis is also scheduled to meet with Medvedev during his one-day visit.
Hμερομηνία : 25/4/08
Copyright: http://www.ekathimerini.com
Posted by D.Shistohilis
RUSSIA PROFILE.ORG
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russia’s Modernization ChallengeIntroduced by Vladimir FrolovRussia Profile
Contributors: Vlad Ivanenko, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Liakhov, Alexander Rahr
Last week, two new developments highlighted the challenges Russia's President-Elect Dmitry Medvedev will face as he seeks to modernize the country.
On April 15, LUKOIL's Vice President Leonid Fedun told Britain's Financial Times that "Russian oil production has peaked and may never return to current levels." He believes that Russia's figure of about 10 million barrels per day in 2007 is the highest production he will see "in his lifetime." He compared Russia, the world's second-largest oil producer, with the North Sea and Mexico, where oil production is plummeting, "saying that in the oil-rich region of Western Siberia, the mainstay of Russian output, 'the period of intense oil production [growth] is over'."
On April 16, Russia's Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, passed a bill that restricts foreign ownership of "strategic enterprises" to a minority stake. The bill also requires that in certain strategic sectors Russian state companies should have more than 50 percent of shares, while "strategic" oil and gas deposits can also be developed only by state companies with majority control.
The bill also requires the FSB to pass a formal judgment on whether a potential acquisition by a foreign company of a stake in a Russian enterprise on the strategic list presents a threat to Russia's national security, opening the way for corruption and arbitrary government meddling.
Russia's oil production and exports are hindered by the failure to develop new technology and exploit new fields in more challenging geological and environmental conditions. To develop such fields, particularly on the Russian seabed, in the Far East and in the Arctic, Russia needs expertise and technologies employed by international oil majors, the likes of Shell or ExxonMobil. But many foreign firms are reluctant to make new investments and bring new technology to Russia, as a result of what is widely seen as Russia's strong-arm tactics against foreign energy investors in recent years.
Due to underinvestment in exploration and production technologies, Russia may see its main source of revenue--oil exports--go down.
Medvedev inherits a Russia that has largely exhausted the restoration path of development, and is now facing a much tougher challenge – modernization. It will require different approaches than those used under Vladimir Putin, and it will require new engines of growth other than the energy sector. Russia needs massive investments – over a trillion dollars, according to some estimates – into its industrial and transport infrastructure that has been largely inherited from the Soviet Union. It needs to diversify its economy from dependence on natural resources into high technologies, if it wants to remain a major power. It needs to rebuild its public health and education systems to produce a competitive workforce, in a population which will decline over the next decade because of previous poor health conditions.
But Medvedev also inherits some of Putin's policies that might hamper his modernization agenda, as they restrict the flow of Western expertise, technologies, and money necessary to make a breakthrough.
As Tom Graham of "Kissinger & Associates" emphasized in his speech at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, "Success will also require Russia to repair its relations with the West. For Russia cannot modernize itself on its own, even if it must play the largest role. The money, know-how and technology it needs can only be found in the West. And Russia cannot guarantee its security at a time of great global upheaval without friends and allies."
Does Medvedev understand the modernization challenges facing him and the country? Does he realize that the situation calls for a new set of policies that, although building on the past, cannot be a mere continuation of Putin's course? Will he seek engines of Russia's modernization in openness to the outside world and in a cooperative relationship with the West, or will he succumb to the temptation of self-reliance? Does he appear to have an understanding with Putin that to move the country forward new policies are in order? Where does Putin stand on this?
How will Medvedev deal with Russia's stagnating energy sector that has been the principal source of revenue for the Russian budget? How will he treat foreign investors, particularly in strategic sectors? How will he build the relationship with the West, particularly the energy relationship with Europe? What can the West do to help Medvedev modernize Russia?
Alexander Rahr, Director of the Russia Program, German Council on Foreign Relations, and Professor of History, MGIMO State University, Moscow:
The crisis in the Russian oil sector will not be felt over the next five years. Besides oil, there is also gas. The Russian oil sector is not the strongest in the world, anyway. In its goal to become the world's new energy superpower, the Kremlin concentrates more on gas production than on oil delivery. Russian gas will remain the Kremlin's main export asset. Russia fully understands that it has to change its economic policy and place more emphasis on investment in its rotten infrastructure. Typically for Russia, the country's leadership may have developed a master plan on how to proceed further, but it will not implement it, like it did not implement other strategies in the past two decades. It is more important for the Russian elite to use the existing momentum and get richer and richer, than to think about the future.
Is Medvedev going to change the situation? A lot depends on whether he will succeed in getting his liberal economic ideas through the conservative state bureaucracy. As it looks now, Putin will create a government structure mainly for himself, with several deputy prime minister posts, which will mostly go to representatives of the siloviki. It remains to be seen how much of a "policeman" the government will be over the economy in future.
When you ask representatives of the Russian energy sector these days about foreign investments and the need to integrate more Western technological know-how into the Russian economy, you will get the following answer: "We have enough money now to buy all of the needed technologies from the West ourselves. We don't need physical investors from abroad."
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, The Netherlands:
The role of the West in the development of the Russian oil and gas industry, as well as the creation of an innovative economy along with the issue of Russian independence, are all critical and interdependent factors that determine the path to Russia's modernization.
In my view, alarm about declining oil production that threatens Russia's modernization is misplaced. The era of hydrocarbon energy is in its terminal phase. It is probable that the next century will see hydrocarbon energy become obsolete. If Russia wants to become and remain an independent modern economy, it should not treat oil and gas as an overriding priority. Investment, political and administrative efforts, and human resources that flow into the oil and gas sector, come partly at the expense of the other sectors of the economy. Russia should not place itself on the altar of the world's energy demands and become the northern Saudi Arabia as many in the West would prefer to see it.
This certainly does not mean that Russia should abandon its oil and gas sector. Oil and gas can serve Russia well while it is changing its course toward an innovative economy. Since Europe and Asia will remain hungry for Russian oil and gas for decades to come, there is no threat whatsoever that investment or technology will become an issue—just consider the Shtokman project as a case in point. Besides, Russia has sufficient oil and gas reserves in Eastern Siberia, the North-East and the continental shelf to sustain and increase overall hydrocarbon production. That is all Russia needs to get the cash for reforms, and to maintain its geopolitical resource leverage in Eurasia for the next 50 years.
What Russia needs much more than an obsessive fixation on the relatively straightforward oil and gas industry is accelerated development of an innovative economy and of modern society. The 2020 strategy is a blueprint for such an undertaking, designed by Putin's team. The focus has now shifted to the implementation of this strategy—the biggest challenge for Medvedev, Putin, and United Russia. There are substantial grounds for optimism there, if we take into account the revolutionary results of Putin's eight years in power, and the much strengthened Russian socio-political foundation.
Can Russia modernize without the West? The answer is rightfully "no." If you look at the so-called success stories of modernization—Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and China—none would have been possible without the determined geopolitical and geo-economic support of the West. Does this mean that Russia should give up its independence, and beg for support provided on Western terms, as it did in the 1990s? The answer already given by Putin is "no." Russia has become too important a player geopolitically and economically for the West, and particularly for Europe, to artificially contain its economic development. Direct foreign investment is on the rise. Joint projects in the high tech sectors are taking off. Russia's attraction as a place for business and investment is high, and will only improve as Medvedev goes about implementing his plan to establish the rule of law.
There is no basis for doom and gloom when thinking about Russia's modernization. It is, of course, a daunting task. But it can be done in a manner that enhances Russia's unique role in the Russia-Europe-United States partnership, and does not reduce Russia to an oil and gas producing province of the West.
Andrei Liakhov, Doctor of Law and Professor, London:
It is impossible to ascertain what any person, let alone a politician, thinks. Medvedev's business background at Ilim Pulp and at Gazprom allows any observer to believe that the former has a good grasp of the real situation in the Russian economy. He is also aware of the hunt for Russia's natural resources (in the widest sense), which began in 1991, and of the relative inexperience and weaknesses of the Russian business elite which quite often has a negative impact on Russian businesses' international expansion plans. He is also acutely aware of the differences in business culture that exist between Russia and the West, sometimes complicating the matters further.
In all likelihood, he knows about the "grab'n'run" approach adopted by some Western investors to the exploitation of Russia's natural resources. Well-known stories surrounding the development of the Vankor oil deposit by Anglo Siberian, the sorry sagas of Chernogorneft, SIDANKO, and several gold deposits in Yakutia and Kamchatka, make it unlikely that openness to foreign investors will be the answer to Russia's economic problems.
"Russia PLC" has (or at least its management tends to think so) enough resources of its own to ensure its ability to tackle some, if not all, of its development problems, and certainly there is a temptation to "close the company to new investors" and build its interaction with the outside world on the strict basis of sales and purchases.
The impact that all this will have on Medvedev's thinking will only become evident with time. However, the reality is that business is rarely concerned with national borders. With Russian business becoming increasingly interested in expanding internationally (LUKOIL and RusAl are two best known examples), the pressure to be open to international business will increase. The big game, in my view, will be centered on defining the boundary beyond which openness to international business will start threatening Russia's national interests and its national security.
As to where Putin stands on this - both men stated on numerous occasions that they will both work in accordance with the Constitution. The role of the prime minister is to propose and implement economic policies, and thus Putin will continue to play a crucial role in determining the way Russia will interact with the outside world on economic matters. If anything, I would expect his involvement in running the economy on a daily basis to increase.
There are several general problems with the Russian energy sector, each of which has several possible solutions. For example, problems associated with the growth of oil extraction levels originate from more than 17 years of severe underinvestment into geological exploration, the exorbitant level of taxation, and the huge inertia resulting in the unwillingness to introduce modern, efficient extraction methods, which should increase extraction levels at the existing wells. The ever-changing tax regime is seen as the single most serious obstacle to the growth of the Russian oil industry.
None of these problems require selling Russian oil reserves to international majors. The Sakhalin experience shows that participation of international oil majors may not necessarily result in more cost efficient or ecologically friendly development of oil reserves.
However, it would be unwise to refuse international cooperation simply because we can do it ourselves. It is always useful to draw on the boundless experience and expertise of the international oil business, but not necessarily by allowing them to directly participate in the most profitable and promising projects.
Russia has enough money to buy this expertise through hiring experienced managers, commissioning research and development and engineering works from international firms, supporting domestic R&D organizations, and educating local managers at renowned world industry institutions. Russia has a lot of choices, and it would seem that all the board of "Russia PLC" needs to do is to make several key strategic decisions on how fast it wants to achieve the result it needs, because organic growth takes much longer, and growth through farm-ins and acquisitions is more expensive. What choices the board will make, we should see quite soon.
Vlad Ivanenko, PhD, trade and energy analyst, Ottawa:
There are many strange things that go hand in hand in Russia today. Its energy sector revenue is continuously increasing, but leading oilmen cry for help because the sector’s output is stagnating. Statistical indicators point to solid economic growth, but the boom coincides with apparent contraction of economic freedoms for local entrepreneurs. The incumbent president, Vladimir Putin, follows the letter of the law, and transfers presidential powers to the President-Elect Dmitry Medvedev, but subsequently limits the latter’s power with numerous legal and political constraints. Where is Russia heading under president Medvedev?
While several hypotheses are plausible at the moment, the dynamics of the Russian past are likely to shape its future, unless the country experiences an unexpected shock. With this caveat in mind, let’s briefly outline what future Russian leaders did in the past and under what circumstances.
As a vice prime minister, Medvedev experimented and modestly succeeded with the so-called National Projects. Chosen sparingly, these programs - in health, education, and affordable housing - were aimed at developing human capital. This is exactly what the economists at the Washington Consensus School would recommend the government of a developing country to do.
Attaining political stability was Putin’s main achievement. He should also be credited with choosing ministers who maintained budgetary discipline and abstained from excessive regulation on the federal level. In its turn, a favorable macroeconomic environment allowed the Russian economy to thrive. On the negative side, Putin was increasingly reluctant to trust people outside of his inner circle, creating, essentially, a clique.
The political weight of energy magnates has dwindled after the downfall of the richest Russian, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 2003. Energy revenue flooded state coffers, allowing the government to build one of the largest “war chests” in the world. At the same time, the list of Russian billionaires continued to swell, and amounted to 110 in 2007. Metals and construction have become new sources of private wealth.
In external affairs, the Kremlin proclaimed supremacy of national economic interests, which it defined in terms of economic might under its control. Energy has remained at the top of Russian exports, and dominated the export structure even if the latter is considered in constant prices. On the mergers and acquisitions front, national companies expanded in metals and construction abroad. The Kremlin pushed foreigners out of the domestic energy sector, but in other sectors – notably in electric utilities, car manufacturing and food processing – foreign capital expanded.
These observations suggest the following scenario for Medvedev. The new president will have economic development as his overriding objective. Under him, the state will continue to maintain macroeconomic stability, to invest in human capital and in public infrastructure, and to support a few “national champions.” Putin will take charge in controlling the high-ranking state bureaucracy, otherwise uncontrollable because of weak democratic institutions. The economic role of the energy sector may gradually recede as public investments start paying off, and the rest of the economy, particularly food processing, trade, and construction, will become more important. Russia will be able to attract foreign technologies either through direct investments or through mergers and acquisitions, provided that no war-bordering crisis happens in its relationship with the West.
Overall, Medvedev has enough resources to meet the challenge of Russian modernization … albeit as an economist, I hate to see him succeeding without our professional advice!
Contributors: Vlad Ivanenko, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Liakhov, Alexander Rahr
Last week, two new developments highlighted the challenges Russia's President-Elect Dmitry Medvedev will face as he seeks to modernize the country.
On April 15, LUKOIL's Vice President Leonid Fedun told Britain's Financial Times that "Russian oil production has peaked and may never return to current levels." He believes that Russia's figure of about 10 million barrels per day in 2007 is the highest production he will see "in his lifetime." He compared Russia, the world's second-largest oil producer, with the North Sea and Mexico, where oil production is plummeting, "saying that in the oil-rich region of Western Siberia, the mainstay of Russian output, 'the period of intense oil production [growth] is over'."
On April 16, Russia's Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, passed a bill that restricts foreign ownership of "strategic enterprises" to a minority stake. The bill also requires that in certain strategic sectors Russian state companies should have more than 50 percent of shares, while "strategic" oil and gas deposits can also be developed only by state companies with majority control.
The bill also requires the FSB to pass a formal judgment on whether a potential acquisition by a foreign company of a stake in a Russian enterprise on the strategic list presents a threat to Russia's national security, opening the way for corruption and arbitrary government meddling.
Russia's oil production and exports are hindered by the failure to develop new technology and exploit new fields in more challenging geological and environmental conditions. To develop such fields, particularly on the Russian seabed, in the Far East and in the Arctic, Russia needs expertise and technologies employed by international oil majors, the likes of Shell or ExxonMobil. But many foreign firms are reluctant to make new investments and bring new technology to Russia, as a result of what is widely seen as Russia's strong-arm tactics against foreign energy investors in recent years.
Due to underinvestment in exploration and production technologies, Russia may see its main source of revenue--oil exports--go down.
Medvedev inherits a Russia that has largely exhausted the restoration path of development, and is now facing a much tougher challenge – modernization. It will require different approaches than those used under Vladimir Putin, and it will require new engines of growth other than the energy sector. Russia needs massive investments – over a trillion dollars, according to some estimates – into its industrial and transport infrastructure that has been largely inherited from the Soviet Union. It needs to diversify its economy from dependence on natural resources into high technologies, if it wants to remain a major power. It needs to rebuild its public health and education systems to produce a competitive workforce, in a population which will decline over the next decade because of previous poor health conditions.
But Medvedev also inherits some of Putin's policies that might hamper his modernization agenda, as they restrict the flow of Western expertise, technologies, and money necessary to make a breakthrough.
As Tom Graham of "Kissinger & Associates" emphasized in his speech at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, "Success will also require Russia to repair its relations with the West. For Russia cannot modernize itself on its own, even if it must play the largest role. The money, know-how and technology it needs can only be found in the West. And Russia cannot guarantee its security at a time of great global upheaval without friends and allies."
Does Medvedev understand the modernization challenges facing him and the country? Does he realize that the situation calls for a new set of policies that, although building on the past, cannot be a mere continuation of Putin's course? Will he seek engines of Russia's modernization in openness to the outside world and in a cooperative relationship with the West, or will he succumb to the temptation of self-reliance? Does he appear to have an understanding with Putin that to move the country forward new policies are in order? Where does Putin stand on this?
How will Medvedev deal with Russia's stagnating energy sector that has been the principal source of revenue for the Russian budget? How will he treat foreign investors, particularly in strategic sectors? How will he build the relationship with the West, particularly the energy relationship with Europe? What can the West do to help Medvedev modernize Russia?
Alexander Rahr, Director of the Russia Program, German Council on Foreign Relations, and Professor of History, MGIMO State University, Moscow:
The crisis in the Russian oil sector will not be felt over the next five years. Besides oil, there is also gas. The Russian oil sector is not the strongest in the world, anyway. In its goal to become the world's new energy superpower, the Kremlin concentrates more on gas production than on oil delivery. Russian gas will remain the Kremlin's main export asset. Russia fully understands that it has to change its economic policy and place more emphasis on investment in its rotten infrastructure. Typically for Russia, the country's leadership may have developed a master plan on how to proceed further, but it will not implement it, like it did not implement other strategies in the past two decades. It is more important for the Russian elite to use the existing momentum and get richer and richer, than to think about the future.
Is Medvedev going to change the situation? A lot depends on whether he will succeed in getting his liberal economic ideas through the conservative state bureaucracy. As it looks now, Putin will create a government structure mainly for himself, with several deputy prime minister posts, which will mostly go to representatives of the siloviki. It remains to be seen how much of a "policeman" the government will be over the economy in future.
When you ask representatives of the Russian energy sector these days about foreign investments and the need to integrate more Western technological know-how into the Russian economy, you will get the following answer: "We have enough money now to buy all of the needed technologies from the West ourselves. We don't need physical investors from abroad."
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, The Netherlands:
The role of the West in the development of the Russian oil and gas industry, as well as the creation of an innovative economy along with the issue of Russian independence, are all critical and interdependent factors that determine the path to Russia's modernization.
In my view, alarm about declining oil production that threatens Russia's modernization is misplaced. The era of hydrocarbon energy is in its terminal phase. It is probable that the next century will see hydrocarbon energy become obsolete. If Russia wants to become and remain an independent modern economy, it should not treat oil and gas as an overriding priority. Investment, political and administrative efforts, and human resources that flow into the oil and gas sector, come partly at the expense of the other sectors of the economy. Russia should not place itself on the altar of the world's energy demands and become the northern Saudi Arabia as many in the West would prefer to see it.
This certainly does not mean that Russia should abandon its oil and gas sector. Oil and gas can serve Russia well while it is changing its course toward an innovative economy. Since Europe and Asia will remain hungry for Russian oil and gas for decades to come, there is no threat whatsoever that investment or technology will become an issue—just consider the Shtokman project as a case in point. Besides, Russia has sufficient oil and gas reserves in Eastern Siberia, the North-East and the continental shelf to sustain and increase overall hydrocarbon production. That is all Russia needs to get the cash for reforms, and to maintain its geopolitical resource leverage in Eurasia for the next 50 years.
What Russia needs much more than an obsessive fixation on the relatively straightforward oil and gas industry is accelerated development of an innovative economy and of modern society. The 2020 strategy is a blueprint for such an undertaking, designed by Putin's team. The focus has now shifted to the implementation of this strategy—the biggest challenge for Medvedev, Putin, and United Russia. There are substantial grounds for optimism there, if we take into account the revolutionary results of Putin's eight years in power, and the much strengthened Russian socio-political foundation.
Can Russia modernize without the West? The answer is rightfully "no." If you look at the so-called success stories of modernization—Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and China—none would have been possible without the determined geopolitical and geo-economic support of the West. Does this mean that Russia should give up its independence, and beg for support provided on Western terms, as it did in the 1990s? The answer already given by Putin is "no." Russia has become too important a player geopolitically and economically for the West, and particularly for Europe, to artificially contain its economic development. Direct foreign investment is on the rise. Joint projects in the high tech sectors are taking off. Russia's attraction as a place for business and investment is high, and will only improve as Medvedev goes about implementing his plan to establish the rule of law.
There is no basis for doom and gloom when thinking about Russia's modernization. It is, of course, a daunting task. But it can be done in a manner that enhances Russia's unique role in the Russia-Europe-United States partnership, and does not reduce Russia to an oil and gas producing province of the West.
Andrei Liakhov, Doctor of Law and Professor, London:
It is impossible to ascertain what any person, let alone a politician, thinks. Medvedev's business background at Ilim Pulp and at Gazprom allows any observer to believe that the former has a good grasp of the real situation in the Russian economy. He is also aware of the hunt for Russia's natural resources (in the widest sense), which began in 1991, and of the relative inexperience and weaknesses of the Russian business elite which quite often has a negative impact on Russian businesses' international expansion plans. He is also acutely aware of the differences in business culture that exist between Russia and the West, sometimes complicating the matters further.
In all likelihood, he knows about the "grab'n'run" approach adopted by some Western investors to the exploitation of Russia's natural resources. Well-known stories surrounding the development of the Vankor oil deposit by Anglo Siberian, the sorry sagas of Chernogorneft, SIDANKO, and several gold deposits in Yakutia and Kamchatka, make it unlikely that openness to foreign investors will be the answer to Russia's economic problems.
"Russia PLC" has (or at least its management tends to think so) enough resources of its own to ensure its ability to tackle some, if not all, of its development problems, and certainly there is a temptation to "close the company to new investors" and build its interaction with the outside world on the strict basis of sales and purchases.
The impact that all this will have on Medvedev's thinking will only become evident with time. However, the reality is that business is rarely concerned with national borders. With Russian business becoming increasingly interested in expanding internationally (LUKOIL and RusAl are two best known examples), the pressure to be open to international business will increase. The big game, in my view, will be centered on defining the boundary beyond which openness to international business will start threatening Russia's national interests and its national security.
As to where Putin stands on this - both men stated on numerous occasions that they will both work in accordance with the Constitution. The role of the prime minister is to propose and implement economic policies, and thus Putin will continue to play a crucial role in determining the way Russia will interact with the outside world on economic matters. If anything, I would expect his involvement in running the economy on a daily basis to increase.
There are several general problems with the Russian energy sector, each of which has several possible solutions. For example, problems associated with the growth of oil extraction levels originate from more than 17 years of severe underinvestment into geological exploration, the exorbitant level of taxation, and the huge inertia resulting in the unwillingness to introduce modern, efficient extraction methods, which should increase extraction levels at the existing wells. The ever-changing tax regime is seen as the single most serious obstacle to the growth of the Russian oil industry.
None of these problems require selling Russian oil reserves to international majors. The Sakhalin experience shows that participation of international oil majors may not necessarily result in more cost efficient or ecologically friendly development of oil reserves.
However, it would be unwise to refuse international cooperation simply because we can do it ourselves. It is always useful to draw on the boundless experience and expertise of the international oil business, but not necessarily by allowing them to directly participate in the most profitable and promising projects.
Russia has enough money to buy this expertise through hiring experienced managers, commissioning research and development and engineering works from international firms, supporting domestic R&D organizations, and educating local managers at renowned world industry institutions. Russia has a lot of choices, and it would seem that all the board of "Russia PLC" needs to do is to make several key strategic decisions on how fast it wants to achieve the result it needs, because organic growth takes much longer, and growth through farm-ins and acquisitions is more expensive. What choices the board will make, we should see quite soon.
Vlad Ivanenko, PhD, trade and energy analyst, Ottawa:
There are many strange things that go hand in hand in Russia today. Its energy sector revenue is continuously increasing, but leading oilmen cry for help because the sector’s output is stagnating. Statistical indicators point to solid economic growth, but the boom coincides with apparent contraction of economic freedoms for local entrepreneurs. The incumbent president, Vladimir Putin, follows the letter of the law, and transfers presidential powers to the President-Elect Dmitry Medvedev, but subsequently limits the latter’s power with numerous legal and political constraints. Where is Russia heading under president Medvedev?
While several hypotheses are plausible at the moment, the dynamics of the Russian past are likely to shape its future, unless the country experiences an unexpected shock. With this caveat in mind, let’s briefly outline what future Russian leaders did in the past and under what circumstances.
As a vice prime minister, Medvedev experimented and modestly succeeded with the so-called National Projects. Chosen sparingly, these programs - in health, education, and affordable housing - were aimed at developing human capital. This is exactly what the economists at the Washington Consensus School would recommend the government of a developing country to do.
Attaining political stability was Putin’s main achievement. He should also be credited with choosing ministers who maintained budgetary discipline and abstained from excessive regulation on the federal level. In its turn, a favorable macroeconomic environment allowed the Russian economy to thrive. On the negative side, Putin was increasingly reluctant to trust people outside of his inner circle, creating, essentially, a clique.
The political weight of energy magnates has dwindled after the downfall of the richest Russian, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 2003. Energy revenue flooded state coffers, allowing the government to build one of the largest “war chests” in the world. At the same time, the list of Russian billionaires continued to swell, and amounted to 110 in 2007. Metals and construction have become new sources of private wealth.
In external affairs, the Kremlin proclaimed supremacy of national economic interests, which it defined in terms of economic might under its control. Energy has remained at the top of Russian exports, and dominated the export structure even if the latter is considered in constant prices. On the mergers and acquisitions front, national companies expanded in metals and construction abroad. The Kremlin pushed foreigners out of the domestic energy sector, but in other sectors – notably in electric utilities, car manufacturing and food processing – foreign capital expanded.
These observations suggest the following scenario for Medvedev. The new president will have economic development as his overriding objective. Under him, the state will continue to maintain macroeconomic stability, to invest in human capital and in public infrastructure, and to support a few “national champions.” Putin will take charge in controlling the high-ranking state bureaucracy, otherwise uncontrollable because of weak democratic institutions. The economic role of the energy sector may gradually recede as public investments start paying off, and the rest of the economy, particularly food processing, trade, and construction, will become more important. Russia will be able to attract foreign technologies either through direct investments or through mergers and acquisitions, provided that no war-bordering crisis happens in its relationship with the West.
Overall, Medvedev has enough resources to meet the challenge of Russian modernization … albeit as an economist, I hate to see him succeeding without our professional advice!
Δευτέρα 7 Απριλίου 2008
French energy giant EDF may lead British nuclear power plant update
EDF, the energy company controlled by the French Government, has said that it wants to build four new nuclear power stations in Britain — a far more ambitious proposal than any of the other five big utilities in the UK.
The Government has estimated that each plant would cost about £2.8 billion to build, but the cost could run to as much as £3.6 billion. EDF has also stated clearly that all four of these would be to a French design developed by Areva, the nuclear energy giant that is also part-owned by the French state.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
The Government has estimated that each plant would cost about £2.8 billion to build, but the cost could run to as much as £3.6 billion. EDF has also stated clearly that all four of these would be to a French design developed by Areva, the nuclear energy giant that is also part-owned by the French state.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE GREEK NATURAL GAS MARKET
The Greek Natural gas market is regulated by Law 3428/2005 (Official Gazette A΄ 313 / 27.12.05), transposing the Directive 2003/55/EC.
Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid law, a TSO has been established (“Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator SA” - DESFA) through the Presidential Decrees 33 and 34 (Official Gazette A΄ 31 / 20.02.2007).
The National Natural Gas System is operated by DESFA subject to the provisions of the Network Code, a draft version of which is available here.
Third party access to the National Natural Gas Transmission System during the transitional period, will follow the terms and provisions of Ministerial Decision No 1227 (Official Gazette Β΄ 135 / 05.02.2007), establishing the procedure for the conclusion and the contents of the standard transmission contract for the access and use of the Transmission System.
TPA tariffs have been determined by Ministerial Decision 4955/2006 following a proposal by RAE (see explanatory note and unofficial translation). A new tariff regulation shall be established pursuant to Law 3428/2005.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid law, a TSO has been established (“Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator SA” - DESFA) through the Presidential Decrees 33 and 34 (Official Gazette A΄ 31 / 20.02.2007).
The National Natural Gas System is operated by DESFA subject to the provisions of the Network Code, a draft version of which is available here.
Third party access to the National Natural Gas Transmission System during the transitional period, will follow the terms and provisions of Ministerial Decision No 1227 (Official Gazette Β΄ 135 / 05.02.2007), establishing the procedure for the conclusion and the contents of the standard transmission contract for the access and use of the Transmission System.
TPA tariffs have been determined by Ministerial Decision 4955/2006 following a proposal by RAE (see explanatory note and unofficial translation). A new tariff regulation shall be established pursuant to Law 3428/2005.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
ENERGISING EUROPE: A real market with secure supply
Today a new momentum has been given to the energy policy for Europe. The European Commission has adopted a third package of legislative proposals[1] to ensure a real and effective choice of supplier and benefits to every single EU citizen. The Commission's proposals put consumer choice, fairer prices, cleaner energy and security of supply at the centre of its approach.
The package promotes sustainability by stimulating energy efficiency and guaranteeing that even smaller companies, for instance those that invest in renewable energy, have access to the energy market. A competitive market will also ensure greater security of supply, by improving the conditions for investments in power plants and transmission networks, and thus help avoid interruptions in power or gas supplies. Guarantees of fair competition with third country companies are also strengthened.
"An open and fair internal energy market is essential to ensure that the EU can rise to the challenges of climate change, increased import dependence and global competitiveness. This is about getting a better deal for consumers and business and making sure that third country companies respect our rules", explained European Commission President Barroso.
"We have moved a long way towards an internal energy market in the EU over the last 10 years. It is now time to complete this process and ensure that the benefits of this market are real, effective and available to each and every person and company. The EU now has to take the necessary steps to ensure that all its citizens can choose their own supplier and be sure that they are getting the best deal", said Energy Commissioner Piebalgs.
"The time has come for households and businesses to enjoy the full benefits of a competitive energy market in terms of choice of supplier and fairer prices. Today's proposals would deliver these benefits", told Competition Commissioner Kroes.
To make the internal market work for all consumers whether large or small, and to help the EU achieve more secure, competitive and sustainable energy, the Commission is proposing a number of measures to complement the existing rules.
- Separation of production and supply from transmission networks: Network ownership and operation should be "unbundled". This refers to the separation between the network operation of electricity and gas from supply and generation activities. The proposals make it clear that the Commission's preferred option in this respect is ownership unbundling - in other words that a single company can no longer own both transmission and be occupied in energy production or supply activities. In addition, the Commission proposes a second option, the "independent system operator" which makes it possible for existing vertically integrated companies to retain network ownership, but provided that the assets are actually operated by a company or body completely independent from it. Either one of these options will create new incentives for companies to invest in new infrastructure, inter-connection capacity and new generation capacity, thereby avoiding black-outs and unnecessary price surges.
- The Commission recognizes the strategic importance of Energy Policy. Therefore the package contains safeguards to ensure that in the event that companies from third countries wish to acquire a significant interest or even control over an EU network, they will have to demonstrably and unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements as EU companies. The Commission can intervene where a purchaser cannot demonstrate both its direct and indirect independence from supply and generation activities.
- Facilitating cross-border energy trade: The Commission proposes to establish an Agency for the cooperation of National Energy Regulators, with binding decision powers, to complement National Regulators. This will ensure the proper handling of cross-border cases and enable the EU to develop a real European network working as one single grid, promoting diversity and security of supply.
- More effective national regulators: the Commission proposes measures to strengthen and guarantee the independence of national regulators in Member States.
- Promoting cross border collaboration and investment: The Commission proposes a new European Network for Transmission System Operators. EU grid operators would cooperate and develop common commercial and technical codes and security standards, as well as plan and coordinate the investments needed at EU level. This would also ease cross border trade and create a more level playing field for operators.
- Greater transparency: Steps to improve market transparency on network operation and supply will guarantee equal access to information, make pricing more transparent, increase trust in the market and help avoid market manipulation.
- Increased solidarity: by bringing national markets closer together, the Commission foresees more potential for Member States to assist one another in the face of energy supply threats.
Customers will also benefit from a new Energy Customers' Charter to be launched in 2008. This will include measures to address fuel poverty, information for customers to choose a supplier and supply options, actions to lower red tape when changing energy suppliers and to protect citizens from unfair selling practises. A separate information campaign will inform customers of their rights.
The proposed package of measures was anticipated in the Commission's Energy Policy for Europe[2] which was endorsed by the European Council in March 2007. This set out the need for the EU to draw up a new energy path towards a more secure, sustainable and low-carbon economy, for the benefit of all citizens. Fully competitive markets are an essential pre-requisite to reaching this goal. From 1 July 2007, citizens across the EU already have a right to choose their supplier. The new package aims to ensure that all suppliers fulfil high standards of service, sustainability and security.
The Commission's proposals for the internal energy market are an integral part of the Lisbon Strategy and the EU's energy strategy and will be discussed among Heads of State and Government at their regular Summits.All texts will be available here:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/package_2007/index_en.htm
[1] A Regulation establishing the EU Agency for the cooperation of National Energy Regulators
• An Electricity Directive amending and completing the existing Electricity Directive 2003/54
• A Gas Directive amending and completing the existing Gas Directive 2003/55
• An Electricity Regulation amending and completing the existing Electricity Regulation 1228/03
• A Gas Regulation amending and completing the existing Gas Regulation 1775/05
[2] (COM(2007)1 final)
Posted by D.Shistohilis
The package promotes sustainability by stimulating energy efficiency and guaranteeing that even smaller companies, for instance those that invest in renewable energy, have access to the energy market. A competitive market will also ensure greater security of supply, by improving the conditions for investments in power plants and transmission networks, and thus help avoid interruptions in power or gas supplies. Guarantees of fair competition with third country companies are also strengthened.
"An open and fair internal energy market is essential to ensure that the EU can rise to the challenges of climate change, increased import dependence and global competitiveness. This is about getting a better deal for consumers and business and making sure that third country companies respect our rules", explained European Commission President Barroso.
"We have moved a long way towards an internal energy market in the EU over the last 10 years. It is now time to complete this process and ensure that the benefits of this market are real, effective and available to each and every person and company. The EU now has to take the necessary steps to ensure that all its citizens can choose their own supplier and be sure that they are getting the best deal", said Energy Commissioner Piebalgs.
"The time has come for households and businesses to enjoy the full benefits of a competitive energy market in terms of choice of supplier and fairer prices. Today's proposals would deliver these benefits", told Competition Commissioner Kroes.
To make the internal market work for all consumers whether large or small, and to help the EU achieve more secure, competitive and sustainable energy, the Commission is proposing a number of measures to complement the existing rules.
- Separation of production and supply from transmission networks: Network ownership and operation should be "unbundled". This refers to the separation between the network operation of electricity and gas from supply and generation activities. The proposals make it clear that the Commission's preferred option in this respect is ownership unbundling - in other words that a single company can no longer own both transmission and be occupied in energy production or supply activities. In addition, the Commission proposes a second option, the "independent system operator" which makes it possible for existing vertically integrated companies to retain network ownership, but provided that the assets are actually operated by a company or body completely independent from it. Either one of these options will create new incentives for companies to invest in new infrastructure, inter-connection capacity and new generation capacity, thereby avoiding black-outs and unnecessary price surges.
- The Commission recognizes the strategic importance of Energy Policy. Therefore the package contains safeguards to ensure that in the event that companies from third countries wish to acquire a significant interest or even control over an EU network, they will have to demonstrably and unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements as EU companies. The Commission can intervene where a purchaser cannot demonstrate both its direct and indirect independence from supply and generation activities.
- Facilitating cross-border energy trade: The Commission proposes to establish an Agency for the cooperation of National Energy Regulators, with binding decision powers, to complement National Regulators. This will ensure the proper handling of cross-border cases and enable the EU to develop a real European network working as one single grid, promoting diversity and security of supply.
- More effective national regulators: the Commission proposes measures to strengthen and guarantee the independence of national regulators in Member States.
- Promoting cross border collaboration and investment: The Commission proposes a new European Network for Transmission System Operators. EU grid operators would cooperate and develop common commercial and technical codes and security standards, as well as plan and coordinate the investments needed at EU level. This would also ease cross border trade and create a more level playing field for operators.
- Greater transparency: Steps to improve market transparency on network operation and supply will guarantee equal access to information, make pricing more transparent, increase trust in the market and help avoid market manipulation.
- Increased solidarity: by bringing national markets closer together, the Commission foresees more potential for Member States to assist one another in the face of energy supply threats.
Customers will also benefit from a new Energy Customers' Charter to be launched in 2008. This will include measures to address fuel poverty, information for customers to choose a supplier and supply options, actions to lower red tape when changing energy suppliers and to protect citizens from unfair selling practises. A separate information campaign will inform customers of their rights.
The proposed package of measures was anticipated in the Commission's Energy Policy for Europe[2] which was endorsed by the European Council in March 2007. This set out the need for the EU to draw up a new energy path towards a more secure, sustainable and low-carbon economy, for the benefit of all citizens. Fully competitive markets are an essential pre-requisite to reaching this goal. From 1 July 2007, citizens across the EU already have a right to choose their supplier. The new package aims to ensure that all suppliers fulfil high standards of service, sustainability and security.
The Commission's proposals for the internal energy market are an integral part of the Lisbon Strategy and the EU's energy strategy and will be discussed among Heads of State and Government at their regular Summits.All texts will be available here:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/package_2007/index_en.htm
[1] A Regulation establishing the EU Agency for the cooperation of National Energy Regulators
• An Electricity Directive amending and completing the existing Electricity Directive 2003/54
• A Gas Directive amending and completing the existing Gas Directive 2003/55
• An Electricity Regulation amending and completing the existing Electricity Regulation 1228/03
• A Gas Regulation amending and completing the existing Gas Regulation 1775/05
[2] (COM(2007)1 final)
Posted by D.Shistohilis
FYROM Opens Door to Wind Energy
27 March 2008 Skopje _ Macedonia is preparing the necessary legislation for its first wind farms to be built.Within two months, the list of the exact directions and requirements for building wind farms in the country will be available to the investors’ through the Economy Ministry’s website, government spokesman Ivica Bocevski said.“This will ease the whole procedure,” Bocevski noted, adding there is increased interest in building these kinds of environmentally-friendly energy plants. Feasibility studies for building turbines in certain gusty regions of the country are already being made. Macedonia’s main power supply comes from its several thermo-electric plants as well as hydroelectric plants. However, the country is forced to import a portion of its power demand every year. Local experts argue Macedonia has good wind potential that if harnessed properly, it could significantly decrease the need for energy imports.
Copyright BalkanInsight.com 2008
Copyright BalkanInsight.com 2008
GREEK FUNDS INVESTED IN F.Y.R.of Macedonia
Οι δέκα μεγαλύτεροι Έλληνες επενδυτές στην ΠΓΔΜ σύμφωνα με τα στοιχεία που έδωσε στη δημοσιότητα η Κεντρική Τράπεζα της ΠΓΔΜ πέρυσι:
1. Ελληνικά Πετρέλαια (Okta Skopje Ad) - 200.000.000
2. Εθνική Τράπεζα (Stopanska Banka) - 178.000.000
3. ΟΤΕ (Cosmofon) - 135.000.000
4. Τσιμέντα ΤΙΤΑΝ (Usje Cementarnica) - 75.000.000
5. Αθηναϊκή Ζυθοποιϊα (Privara) - 60.000.000
6. Μάρμαρα Κυριακίδης (Mermeren Kombinat) - 50.000.000
7. Βερόπουλος (Vero - Veropoulos) - 40.000.000
8. Alpha Bank (Alpha Bank) - 25.000.000
9. ΕΛΒΙΑΚΟ-ΦΙΛΛΙΠΟΥ (Zitoluks) - 15.000.000
10. ΝΙΚΑΣ (Nikas Skop Doo) - 7.000.000
D.Shistohilis
1. Ελληνικά Πετρέλαια (Okta Skopje Ad) - 200.000.000
2. Εθνική Τράπεζα (Stopanska Banka) - 178.000.000
3. ΟΤΕ (Cosmofon) - 135.000.000
4. Τσιμέντα ΤΙΤΑΝ (Usje Cementarnica) - 75.000.000
5. Αθηναϊκή Ζυθοποιϊα (Privara) - 60.000.000
6. Μάρμαρα Κυριακίδης (Mermeren Kombinat) - 50.000.000
7. Βερόπουλος (Vero - Veropoulos) - 40.000.000
8. Alpha Bank (Alpha Bank) - 25.000.000
9. ΕΛΒΙΑΚΟ-ΦΙΛΛΙΠΟΥ (Zitoluks) - 15.000.000
10. ΝΙΚΑΣ (Nikas Skop Doo) - 7.000.000
D.Shistohilis
ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΚΟ ΙΣΟΖΥΓΙΟ
Παραγωγή ηλεκτρισμού ανά καύσιμο (Electricity produced per fuel)
Σήμερα (τέλος 2007) η συνολική ισχύς ηλεκτροπαραγωγής στην Ελλάδα ανέρχεται στις 13.700 MW με πρόβλεψη για το 2020 στις 18.500MW.
Παρακάτω ένας ωφέλιμος για εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων πίνακας όσον αφορά την συμμετοχή σε % ανά καύσιμο στο σύνολο της ηλεκτροπαραγωγής και πόσο θα ανέλθει η συμμετοχή αυτή κατά το έτος 2020.
Μορφή καυσίμου / έτος / % συμμετοχής στο σύνολο παραγωγής / σε MW
Αιολικά / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 5,62% και 20 % / σε ΜW 702,50 & 3700
Άλλες Α.Π.Ε / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 0% & 1,40% / σε MW 0 & 259
Υδροηλεκτρικά / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 12,07% & 6,80% / σε MW 1508,75 & 1258,00
Βιομάζα-Βιοαέριο / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 0,17% & 1,70% / σε MW 212,50 & 324,50
Φυσικό αέριο / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 18,02% & 13,40% / σε MW 2252,25 & 2479,00
Πετρελαϊκά προϊόντα / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 13,90% & 11,30% / σε MW 1737,50 & 2085,50
Λιθάνθρακας / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 0% & 20% / σε MW 0 & 3700
Λιγνίτης / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 50,22% & 25,40% / σε MW 7277,50 & 4699
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 100% & 100% / σε MW 13700 & 18500
Τι εκπέμπει κάθε καύσιμο:
Λιγνίτης: 900 γρ CO2 / KWh
Λιθάνθρακας: 750 γρ CO2 / KWh
Φυσικό αέριο: 350 γρ CO2 / KWh
ΧΑΡΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΑΘΜΩΝ ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΗΣ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ
Περιοχή / Καύσιμο / Ισχύς σε MW / Ετήσια εκπομπή (CO2x1000τόννοι)
ΦΛΩΡΙΝΑ / Λιγνίτης / 300 / 1700
ΠΤΟΛΕΜΑΪΔΑ / Λιγνίτης / 620 / 3800
ΚΑΡΔΙΑ ΚΟΖΑΝΗΣ / Λιγνίτης / 1250 / 8800
ΑΓ.ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ / Λιγνίτης / 1595 / 12300
ΑΣΤΑΚΟΣ / Λιθάνθρακας / 600 / 3200 (Υ.Κ.)
ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΟΛΗ / Λιγνίτης / 850 / 8500
ΑΜΥΝΤΑΙΟ / Λιγνίτης / 600 / 5100
ΑΣΠΡΑ ΣΠΙΤΙΑ / Λιθάνθρακας / 600 / 3200 (Υ.Κ.)
ΧΑΝΙΑ / Ντίζελ / 321 / 702
ΒΙΠΕ ΘΕΣ/ΝΚΗΣ / Φυσικό Αέριο / 390 /596
ΑΛΜΥΡΟΣ / Λιθάνθρακας / 1600 / 9500 (Υ.Κ.)
ΚΑΒΑΛΑ / Λιθάνθρακας / 1600 / 9500 (Υ.Κ)
ΛΑΥΡΙΟ / Μαζούτ – φυσικό αέριο / 1572 / 3500
ΘΗΒΑ / Φυσικό Αέριο / 147 / 10
ΛΙΝΟΠΕΡΑΜΑΤΑ / Μαζούτ – Ντίζελ / 192,87 / 870
ΚΟΜΟΤΗΝΗ / Φυσικό Αέριο / 485 / 880
ΜΑΝΤΟΥΔΙ / Λιθάνθρακας / 420 / 2400 (Υ.Κ.)
ΛΑΡΥΜΝΑ / Λιθάνθρακας / 800 / 4000 (Υ.Κ.)
ΑΛΙΒΕΡΙ / Μαζούτ / 380 / 1100
ΑΛΙΒΕΡΙ / Λιθάνθρακας / 800 / 4000 (Υ.Κ.)
ΡΟΔΟΣ / Μαζούτ – Ντίζελ / 234 / 529
Πιο πιεστικές είναι πλέον οι ευρωπαϊκές ντιρεκτίβες στα κράτη-μέλη της ΕΕ ώστε να επιτευχθεί η αλλαγή του ενεργειακού χάρτη της Γηραιάς Ηπείρου, με απώτερο στόχο την προστασία του περιβάλλοντος.
Ειδικότερα, μέχρι το 2020 θα πρέπει οι ευρωπαϊκές χώρες να μειώσουν τις εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα (CO2) από τον ενεργειακό τομέα κατά τουλάχιστον 20%, αν εξοικονομήσουν 20% της συνολικά καταναλισκόμενης ενέργειας και να εντάξουν τις ΑΠΕ κατά 20% στο ενεργειακό τους ισοζύγιο.
Στις 23/01/2008 η ΕΕ παρουσίασε ένα σχέδιο Οδηγίας για τις ΑΠΕ που εξειδικεύει ορισμένους από αυτούς τους στόχους. Για την Ελλάδα οι νέες δεσμεύσεις μεταφράζονται:
- 18% της τελικής κατανάλωσης ενέργειας υποχρεωτικά μέχρι το 2020
- Υποχρεωτικός στόχος 10% μέχρι το 2020 για βιοκαύσιμα
- Εξοικονόμηση ενέργειας 20% μέχρι το 2020
Οι εκτιμήσεις βασίζονται στο βασικό Σενάριο Αναμενόμενης Εξέλιξης που παρουσιάζει η χώρα μας στους διεθνείς οργανισμούς, προσαρμοσμένο ώστε να περιλάβει τις νέες δεσμεύσεις και υποχρεώσεις της χώρας.
Με βάση λοιπόν αυτό το σενάριο, οι ΑΠΕ θα πρέπει να κατέχουν ένα μερίδιο που μεταφράζεται σε παραγωγή 28,1 TWh (η Τεραβατώρα είναι 1 δις κιλοβατώρες) επί συνόλου 85 TWh ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας το 2020.
Το υπόλοιπο θα καλύψουν ο λιγνίτης, το φυσικό αέριο και το πετρέλαιο, ενώ δεν προβλέπεται να κατασκευαστεί κανένας ανθρακικός σταθμός.
Σε αυτό το σενάριο τόσο ο ρόλος του λιγνίτη όσο και του πετρελαίου βαίνουν διαρκώς μειούμενοι, ενώ οι σταθμοί φυσικού αερίου γνωρίζουν μια άνθηση κυρίως την επόμενη πενταετία και στη συνέχεια παρουσιάζουν στασιμότητα.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
Sources:
Ministry of Development
Public Electricity Organization
Σήμερα (τέλος 2007) η συνολική ισχύς ηλεκτροπαραγωγής στην Ελλάδα ανέρχεται στις 13.700 MW με πρόβλεψη για το 2020 στις 18.500MW.
Παρακάτω ένας ωφέλιμος για εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων πίνακας όσον αφορά την συμμετοχή σε % ανά καύσιμο στο σύνολο της ηλεκτροπαραγωγής και πόσο θα ανέλθει η συμμετοχή αυτή κατά το έτος 2020.
Μορφή καυσίμου / έτος / % συμμετοχής στο σύνολο παραγωγής / σε MW
Αιολικά / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 5,62% και 20 % / σε ΜW 702,50 & 3700
Άλλες Α.Π.Ε / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 0% & 1,40% / σε MW 0 & 259
Υδροηλεκτρικά / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 12,07% & 6,80% / σε MW 1508,75 & 1258,00
Βιομάζα-Βιοαέριο / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 0,17% & 1,70% / σε MW 212,50 & 324,50
Φυσικό αέριο / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 18,02% & 13,40% / σε MW 2252,25 & 2479,00
Πετρελαϊκά προϊόντα / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 13,90% & 11,30% / σε MW 1737,50 & 2085,50
Λιθάνθρακας / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 0% & 20% / σε MW 0 & 3700
Λιγνίτης / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 50,22% & 25,40% / σε MW 7277,50 & 4699
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ / έτος 2007 και 2020 αντίστοιχα / 100% & 100% / σε MW 13700 & 18500
Τι εκπέμπει κάθε καύσιμο:
Λιγνίτης: 900 γρ CO2 / KWh
Λιθάνθρακας: 750 γρ CO2 / KWh
Φυσικό αέριο: 350 γρ CO2 / KWh
ΧΑΡΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΑΘΜΩΝ ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΗΣ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ
Περιοχή / Καύσιμο / Ισχύς σε MW / Ετήσια εκπομπή (CO2x1000τόννοι)
ΦΛΩΡΙΝΑ / Λιγνίτης / 300 / 1700
ΠΤΟΛΕΜΑΪΔΑ / Λιγνίτης / 620 / 3800
ΚΑΡΔΙΑ ΚΟΖΑΝΗΣ / Λιγνίτης / 1250 / 8800
ΑΓ.ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ / Λιγνίτης / 1595 / 12300
ΑΣΤΑΚΟΣ / Λιθάνθρακας / 600 / 3200 (Υ.Κ.)
ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΟΛΗ / Λιγνίτης / 850 / 8500
ΑΜΥΝΤΑΙΟ / Λιγνίτης / 600 / 5100
ΑΣΠΡΑ ΣΠΙΤΙΑ / Λιθάνθρακας / 600 / 3200 (Υ.Κ.)
ΧΑΝΙΑ / Ντίζελ / 321 / 702
ΒΙΠΕ ΘΕΣ/ΝΚΗΣ / Φυσικό Αέριο / 390 /596
ΑΛΜΥΡΟΣ / Λιθάνθρακας / 1600 / 9500 (Υ.Κ.)
ΚΑΒΑΛΑ / Λιθάνθρακας / 1600 / 9500 (Υ.Κ)
ΛΑΥΡΙΟ / Μαζούτ – φυσικό αέριο / 1572 / 3500
ΘΗΒΑ / Φυσικό Αέριο / 147 / 10
ΛΙΝΟΠΕΡΑΜΑΤΑ / Μαζούτ – Ντίζελ / 192,87 / 870
ΚΟΜΟΤΗΝΗ / Φυσικό Αέριο / 485 / 880
ΜΑΝΤΟΥΔΙ / Λιθάνθρακας / 420 / 2400 (Υ.Κ.)
ΛΑΡΥΜΝΑ / Λιθάνθρακας / 800 / 4000 (Υ.Κ.)
ΑΛΙΒΕΡΙ / Μαζούτ / 380 / 1100
ΑΛΙΒΕΡΙ / Λιθάνθρακας / 800 / 4000 (Υ.Κ.)
ΡΟΔΟΣ / Μαζούτ – Ντίζελ / 234 / 529
Πιο πιεστικές είναι πλέον οι ευρωπαϊκές ντιρεκτίβες στα κράτη-μέλη της ΕΕ ώστε να επιτευχθεί η αλλαγή του ενεργειακού χάρτη της Γηραιάς Ηπείρου, με απώτερο στόχο την προστασία του περιβάλλοντος.
Ειδικότερα, μέχρι το 2020 θα πρέπει οι ευρωπαϊκές χώρες να μειώσουν τις εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα (CO2) από τον ενεργειακό τομέα κατά τουλάχιστον 20%, αν εξοικονομήσουν 20% της συνολικά καταναλισκόμενης ενέργειας και να εντάξουν τις ΑΠΕ κατά 20% στο ενεργειακό τους ισοζύγιο.
Στις 23/01/2008 η ΕΕ παρουσίασε ένα σχέδιο Οδηγίας για τις ΑΠΕ που εξειδικεύει ορισμένους από αυτούς τους στόχους. Για την Ελλάδα οι νέες δεσμεύσεις μεταφράζονται:
- 18% της τελικής κατανάλωσης ενέργειας υποχρεωτικά μέχρι το 2020
- Υποχρεωτικός στόχος 10% μέχρι το 2020 για βιοκαύσιμα
- Εξοικονόμηση ενέργειας 20% μέχρι το 2020
Οι εκτιμήσεις βασίζονται στο βασικό Σενάριο Αναμενόμενης Εξέλιξης που παρουσιάζει η χώρα μας στους διεθνείς οργανισμούς, προσαρμοσμένο ώστε να περιλάβει τις νέες δεσμεύσεις και υποχρεώσεις της χώρας.
Με βάση λοιπόν αυτό το σενάριο, οι ΑΠΕ θα πρέπει να κατέχουν ένα μερίδιο που μεταφράζεται σε παραγωγή 28,1 TWh (η Τεραβατώρα είναι 1 δις κιλοβατώρες) επί συνόλου 85 TWh ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας το 2020.
Το υπόλοιπο θα καλύψουν ο λιγνίτης, το φυσικό αέριο και το πετρέλαιο, ενώ δεν προβλέπεται να κατασκευαστεί κανένας ανθρακικός σταθμός.
Σε αυτό το σενάριο τόσο ο ρόλος του λιγνίτη όσο και του πετρελαίου βαίνουν διαρκώς μειούμενοι, ενώ οι σταθμοί φυσικού αερίου γνωρίζουν μια άνθηση κυρίως την επόμενη πενταετία και στη συνέχεια παρουσιάζουν στασιμότητα.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
Sources:
Ministry of Development
Public Electricity Organization
ENERGY OF THE FUTURE: NATURAL GAS
Natural gas offers an extensive range of applications:
- as vehicle fuel
- in private houses / building (offers comfort, it is environmental, cuts energy bills)
- hydrogen as the most promising potential energy
The today reserves of natural gas represent 150 billion tons of oil equivalent which could cover world’s needs for 65 years.
Reserves can be found in former Soviet countries approximately 35%, in the Middle East around 40%.
If from a single fuel source is produced both heat and electricity, then we speak of gas cogeneration which reduces the waste of energy with main advantages the better energy efficiency and the reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
Before the distribution of natural gas a lot of necessary preparation should be done during exploration and extraction but once extracted the natural gas is treated in a special plant and separated to:
- natural gas
- helium
- hydrocarbons LPG
- residual gases
Gas is transported in two ways:
- by sea, it is converted to LNG and carried to special terminals. In Greece we import this LNG from Algeria at a quantity of 0,68 billions of c.m./year at Revithousa Island close to Athens. The LNG is regasified at this terminal and then injected in distribution grid.
- through pipeline. From the producing country to the consumer. In Greece our supplier is Gazexport from Russia at quantities 2,4 billions c.m/year until 2016.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
- as vehicle fuel
- in private houses / building (offers comfort, it is environmental, cuts energy bills)
- hydrogen as the most promising potential energy
The today reserves of natural gas represent 150 billion tons of oil equivalent which could cover world’s needs for 65 years.
Reserves can be found in former Soviet countries approximately 35%, in the Middle East around 40%.
If from a single fuel source is produced both heat and electricity, then we speak of gas cogeneration which reduces the waste of energy with main advantages the better energy efficiency and the reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
Before the distribution of natural gas a lot of necessary preparation should be done during exploration and extraction but once extracted the natural gas is treated in a special plant and separated to:
- natural gas
- helium
- hydrocarbons LPG
- residual gases
Gas is transported in two ways:
- by sea, it is converted to LNG and carried to special terminals. In Greece we import this LNG from Algeria at a quantity of 0,68 billions of c.m./year at Revithousa Island close to Athens. The LNG is regasified at this terminal and then injected in distribution grid.
- through pipeline. From the producing country to the consumer. In Greece our supplier is Gazexport from Russia at quantities 2,4 billions c.m/year until 2016.
Posted by D.Shistohilis
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